Perceptual decision making is the process by which animals detect, discriminate, and categorize information from the senses. Over the past two decades, understanding how perceptual decisions are made has become a central theme in the neurosciences. Exceptional progress has been made by recording from single neurons in the cortex of the macaque monkey and using computational models from mathematical psychology to relate these neural data to behavior. More recently, however, the range of available techniques and paradigms has dramatically broadened, and researchers have begun to harness new approaches to explore how rodents and humans make perceptual decisions. The results have illustrated some striking convergences with findings from the monkey, but also raised new questions and provided new theoretical insights. In this review, we summarize key findings, and highlight open challenges, for understanding perceptual decision making in rodents, monkeys, and humans.
Introduction
The study of perceptual decision making within the cognitive and neural sciences seeks to understand how animals detect, discriminate, and categorize information from the senses. Over the past quarter of a century, a canonical theory has emerged of how perceptual decisions are made in the mammalian brain. Inspired by a marriage of quantitative modeling and neural recordings in non-human primates, the proposal states that neurons in sensorimotor areas, prominently including the parietal and dorsal prefrontal cortex, contribute to perceptual decisions by optimizing input signals through repeated sequential sampling and linear integration to a fixed decision threshold (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Schall, 2003) . This work has brought the study of perceptual decisions to the fore within neuroscience and psychology, and has exemplified the benefits of convergent mathematical and biological approaches to understanding brain function.
However, the last 5 years have seen a tremendous diversification of the theories and methods that are available to study perceptual decision making, and have thrown wide open a number of central questions concerning both the computation of decision variables and their expression in neural circuits. Building on the foundational work using monkeys, there has been an expansion toward studies employing rodents, which allow access to a greater range of experimental methods to measure and manipulate neural activity, and studies involving humans, which permit the investigation of a broader range of complex cognitive behaviors. In the first half of this review (section 1), we describe new methodological approaches using monkeys, rodents, and humans, and discuss how the resulting theoretical insights have begun to reshape the field. We separate this into a set of three sections organized around each model system. In the second half of the review (section 2), we discuss three areas that offer great promise for future research linking model systems. Each of these sections highlights existing work that cuts across species while noting directions where stronger connections may provide insights not possible in any model system alone.
Canonical Perspectives
Perceptual decisions involve the conversion of noisy sensory signals to a discrete motor act. Psychophysical tasks allow researchers to control the nature and quality of sensory input variables, and to reward the animal for specific sensorimotor behaviors. For example, a macaque monkey viewing a random dot kinetogram (RDK; a field of randomly moving dots) might receive a liquid reward for producing a saccade to a spatial target that it has learned to associate with a given motion direction (Newsome and Paré , 1988) ( Figure 1A) . Where information quality is low (for example, when most dots move randomly, and only some in a coherent direction), decisions can be optimized by repeatedly sampling sensory information and integrating (i.e., summing) the resulting direction estimates over time. Accordingly, a long tradition in mathematical psychology has argued that perceptual decisions are initiated when cumulative estimates of noisy sensory variables reach a criterion response threshold (Wald and Wolfowitz, 1949) . In one canonical version of this model, with its roots in decision-theoretic accounts of binary choices, decisions and their latencies are principally controlled by the (drift) rate at which relative information in favor of each of two choices is acquired, the amount of stochasticity (noise) in the representation of this signal, and the level of cumulative information at which choices occur (threshold). This ''drift-diffusion'' model (DDM) successfully accounts for the empirically measured function that relates decision speed and accuracy, and elaborations thereupon can account for the shape of the observed distribution of response times for both correct and error trials under manipulations of
